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Executive Summary 
Introduction to the Conflict Research Programme 
 
The overall goal of the Conflict Research Programme (CRP) is to provide an evidence-
based strategic re-orientation of international engagement in places apparently 
afflicted by the world’s most intractable violent conflicts. Its premise is that in these 
places, the ability of public authorities to provide even the most basic level of 
governance is subject to the functioning of the ‘real politics’ of gaining, managing and 
holding power, which we argue functions as a ‘political marketplace’. This approach 
helps explain the frustrations of state-building and institutionally-focused 
engagement; it can also inform the design of improved interventions, which reduce 
the risk and impact of conflict and violence in developing countries, alleviating poverty 
and insecurity. A key objective of our research, and a key contribution to the ‘Better 
Delivery’ agenda within DFID, is to make policies better targeted, more nuanced and 
rooted in a clear understanding of the social condition that undergirds persistent 
contemporary conflict.  
 
The locations for research are Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Somalia, South 
Sudan and Syria. Our central hypothesis is that governance in these difficult places is 
dominated by the logic of a political marketplace. These political markets are 
turbulent, violent and integrated into regional and global networks of power and 
money. We also hypothesise that moral populism (most visible in identity politics, 
persecuting ideologies and violent extremism) is a counterpart to the marketization 
of politics, and the two flourish in conditions of persistent uncertainty, conflict and 
trauma. Current policy frameworks and tools can neither capture the everyday 
realities of politics and governance in these difficult places, nor adjust to the dynamics 
of contested power relations. External interventions risk being enmeshed in logics of 
power and may end up inadvertently supporting violence and authoritarianism. At the 
same time, in all war-torn spaces, there are relatively peaceful zones: what we term 
‘pockets of civicness’. These might be territorial (local ceasefires, or inclusive local 
authorities) social (civil society groups helping the vulnerable or countering sectarian 
narratives, or customary courts solving disputes fairly) or external (interventions that 
regulate flows of political finance). 
 
The CRP will generate evidence-based, operationally relevant research that can 
enable real-time analysis of the dynamics of conflict, contestation, ‘civicness’ and 
public authority, enabling better interventions to manage and resolve armed conflict, 
reduce violence, and create conditions for more accountable and transparent 
governance. A core component of the CRP is to contribute to a better understanding 
of “what works” in addressing violent conflict across our research sites. We will 
develop comparative understanding of how different interventions affect violent 
conflict and the risk of renewed violent conflict, across our research sites. We will also 
examine the contextual factors that affect the effectiveness of these interventions. 
Intervention areas selected for comparative research: Security interventions; civil 
society and community mediation interventions; resource interventions; and  
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interventions designed to strengthen authority and legitimacy, including at the sub-
national level. We envisage emerging findings from our political economy analysis of 
conflict drivers to shape our comparative analysis of specific interventions.  
 
Our research methods include (a) comparative political ethnography (b) refined 
datasets (c) models of violence and political business (d) socio-political mapping of the 
structural drivers of conflict and the groups involved in political mobilization and 
coercion and (e) action research exploring agents of change. We have a unique and 
robust infrastructure of local researchers and civil society networks across all our sites 
that will facilitate both fieldwork research and remote research. The CRP team is 
already closely engaged with key political processes – and regional actors - in the 
countries concerned, designed to promote peace, humanitarian action, human rights 
and democracy. This engagement is a key part of our method and will ensure that 
evidence-based research is effectively communicated to institutions engaged in trying 
to reduce the risk and impact of violent conflict in our research sites. Our emphasis is 
upon a mix of research methods and mechanisms for engaging in policy and practice. 
In line with this flexible approach, we will hold an annual in-country workshop with 
each DFID country office, and key stakeholders, to work through the implications of 
our research for them in a practical, flexible and responsive way. This will be 
supplemented by regular written and face-to-face/virtual communication with 
country staff.  
Introduction 
 
This CRP synthesis paper presents an overview of shifting dominant narratives on the 
Congo wars and the major findings of a systematic qualitative literature search on 
conflict and violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in relation to the 
political economy of public authority. It identifies gaps and limits in the existing 
literature and engages in current debates on peacebuilding and peacemaking 
strategies and policies.  
 
The paper shows that there are significant gaps in knowledge about the causes of 
conflict and violence in DRC and that this hampers the effectiveness of international 
attempts to support peace and stability. It argues that even though they constitute 
important contributing factors to the production of violence and conflict, the three 
logics of public authority (the logics of the political marketplace, moral populism or 
exclusivist policies, and civicness, or what we call citoyenneté) are poorly understood. 
These logics manifest themselves in and operate through trans-boundary power 
networks that alternately compete and collaborate with each other over public 
authority, people, territory and resources.  
 
While fully cognisant that better and more evidence cannot solve any conflict or stop 
violence, the paper argues that better knowledge and more evidence about the three 
logics of public authority and power networks operating in DRC can contribute to 
identifying potential disconnects between policy and reality and can suggest concrete 
ways to focus and improve international efforts to support peace and stability in DRC.  
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The underlying argument of this paper is that political order in DRC is best understood 
as competing networks of access, with power located in individual network 
connections rather than institutions. In looking at these networks, how they are 
shaped, compete, and what they produce, we can come to a better understanding of 
the broader patterns of Congo’s highly fragmented politics.  
 
The United Nations and its partners in DRC have largely ignored the prevailing logic of 
the marketplace, and failed to recognise that one cannot simply build the state locally 
in isolation of national dynamics, and without understanding how local actors relate 
to national or even regional dynamics. The objective of this paper, therefore, is to help 
re-orient policy thinking and scholarship to these connections.  
 
Over the last two decades, scholars and analysts have pointed to a shift in the nature 
of organised violence, from recognisable armed threats in conflict situations to more 
fragmented political actors and more diffuse and complex threat environments and 
modes of violence. Increasingly, conflict environments feature not only state armies 
but also non-state armed groups, criminal gangs, drug-traffickers, and terrorists, 
where civilians may be both victim and perpetrator. This greater complexity in the 
production of violence has hampered efforts to respond to conflict around the world. 
If the renewed emphasis in many capitals on conflict prevention, or the recent critical 
reviews of United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) peace operations in 2015-
2016, are any indication (High Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, 
2015; Advisory Group of Experts in Review of Peacebuilding Architecture, 2015; World 
Peace Foundation, 2016), there is a growing recognition that our international conflict 
response toolbox is inadequate in the face of new empirical realities, and that the 
existing expensive, international interventions intended to stop the violence and build 
states are not working.   
 
Similar conclusions can be drawn from twenty years of intervention in DRC. One of 
the issues in this case is the dominance of reductionist narratives trying to explain the 
complexity of the Congo wars. While ignoring the multiple layers of conflict, these 
narratives have had both a major impact on research agendas (which tried to provide 
a corrective to them) and on policy responses (with simple solutions to barely 
understood yet very complicated challenges). These narratives have shifted 
considerably over time, yet huge gaps exist in knowledge and variations in what is 
believed to be happening on the ground. While the First Congo War, beginning in 
September 1996, was understood by those outside and inside Congo as a revolution, 
it was, in reality, a regionally built rebellion that put an end to Mobutu’s dictatorship. 
The Second Congo War, which was explained by most accounts as a direct foreign 
invasion driven by what was assumed to be the economic incentives of warring parties 
and factions, was also in fact more of a home-grown rebellion than the first war ever 
was, at least in some parts of the country.  
 
The widely shared conviction that control over natural resources (mostly minerals) 
was a crucial driver of the second war has largely inspired policy responses. Many of 
these responses started from the assumption that cutting the links between resources  
          DRC Synthesis Paper  
6 
 
 
and armed actors would decrease the level of violence, without empirical evidence to 
support this. Recently, the main focus has shifted to the recognition that ‘root causes,’ 
including land access, lack of good governance and poverty, need to be better 
understood and addressed.1 Over time, international objectives in DRC also evolved 
from state-building to stability interventions, thus downgrading ambitions. This shift 
is in line with a more general trend in international approaches to conflict 
environments, which increasingly tend to be based on more realistic ambitions.  
 
This paper recognises the perspective that the Congo wars and their aftermath are 
multi-layered conflicts that combine civil war, inter-state war, and cross-border 
insurgency phenomena, with no neat dividing line between the external and internal 
and public and private boundaries, as financial, political, and ideological factors are 
linked across national, and at times, regional boundaries (Carayannis, 2003). It is our 
contention that the three logics of public authority: the political marketplace, moral 
populism, and ‘civicness’, or what in the Congo case we refer to as citoyenneté, are 
important yet overlooked factors that contribute to production of conflict and 
violence. Crucially, these logics manifest themselves in and operate through what we 
call power networks that alternately compete, collaborate and, occasionally, fight over 
public authority. The notion of network is important to incorporate in the analysis 
because it ruptures simplified understandings and framings of collective action often 
employed in conflict analysis, such as: ethnic groups, local communities, the state, the 
private sector, armed groups, and religious groups, which tend to obscure more than 
they clarify.  
 
Hitherto insufficient understandings of: a) the relevant loci of collective action, 
contestation and competition (power networks), including who is in them; b) the 
modus operandi of these power networks (the three logics of public authority); and, 
c) the form of these networks (trans-boundary and connecting different levels of 
interaction and competition) have undermined international policy engagement to 
end the violence in DRC. Based on an extensive qualitative systematic literature 
review, the paper aims to provide an analytical framework that helps us to unravel the 
three logics of public authority and the role of power networks, which include a variety 
of actors who join forces to gain public authority over people, resources and territory. 
We argue that understanding the three logics is key to a better understanding of the 
layers of conflict and violence in DRC.  
 
The Congo wars, and the continuation of violence that followed the Lusaka peace 
agreement and deployment in 1999 of the UN’s largest peace operation to date, have 
helped shape current thinking about the nature of armed violence and conflict in the 
post-Cold War era; and particularly about what international peace and state building 
strategies can and cannot do. The wars and subsequent humanitarian emergencies in 
DRC and elsewhere in the Central African region (Rwanda, Burundi, Central African  
                                                     
1 We do not see the conceptual value of ‘root causes’ as it suggests that there is one, or at 
most a few overarching and static drivers of conflict. We would instead propose referring to 
‘deep’ and ‘proximate’ causes. 
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Republic) have been a laboratory for two decades of both regional and international 
interventions—from ‘backyard’ and international peacekeeping operations and 
peacebuilding missions, to mediation exercises and humanitarian responses. Yet, the 
violence continues, and threatens the stability of an entire region.   
 
Conflicts in Central Africa and those in other regions should not be seen as isolated 
from one another. They are linked, not necessarily by drivers of conflict, but also by 
the standardised and overly technical approaches of the many international and 
foreign policy bureaucracies whose staff first cut their teeth on the Great Lakes wars 
of the 1990s, beginning with the Burundian crisis of 1993 and the Rwandan genocide 
of 1994; and whose learning curves and learned experiences moved across the Horn 
of Africa, into North Africa and the Middle East. They are also linked by academic and 
policy research on peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and stabilisation, much of it 
empirically driven by the chronologies of these wars. The lessons of what works and 
what has not worked in terms of interventions in the Central African region are thus 
an important departure point for current thinking of what might work and not work 
in responding to more recent intractable conflicts, such as those in North Africa and 
the Middle East. 
 
While challenging dominant narratives on violence and conflict, the Congo wars and 
the various crises in the region over the last two decades (Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, and 
CAR) have also prompted a critical reflection of international responses and have 
inspired the agendas of international agencies, networks, and organisations. 
Numerous studies, analyses, and reports have been produced on Congo, aimed at 
understanding the persistence of violence, and at assessing the impact and limits of 
policy and donor strategies since the signing of inclusive peace accords in 2003 and 
the subsequent transition. This paper provides a critical reading of these documents 
and presents the framework of the three logics of public authority to better unravel 
the complexities of and responses to the Congo wars. It offers an overview of the 
major elements of dominant narratives on the DRC wars and explains how and why 
these have shifted over time. Next, it presents the major findings of the qualitative 
systematic literature search in relation to the three logics we have identified as 
producing public authority: the political marketplace, exclusivist policies and 
‘citoyenneté’. The paper also identifies gaps and limits in existing academic literature 
and policy practice. A subsequent section discusses intervention strategies and policy 
debates.  
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Methodology  
 
This paper is based on a qualitative systematic literature review. The search aimed at 
identifying the existing literature within the social sciences that present empirically 
grounded analysis on the causes, drivers and outcomes of the DRC wars and on the 
persistence of violence since the signing of the peace agreement in 2003. We opted 
for a two-stage approach: a database-driven approach and a snowball search. For this 
last search, we consulted the Congo database of the University of Ghent’s Conflict 
Research Group (CRG), which includes 800+ articles, books, reports and ‘grey’ 
literature selected over the years by the CRG Congo experts. 
 
Four core databases were selected and searched: JSTOR, Web of Science, Google 
Scholar, and WorldCat. The search was carried out in collaboration with the library 
staff of the CRG and using Ghent University search engines. 
 
The following inclusion/exclusion criteria guided the search: 
 
 Time: we opted for 1990, the start of a democratisation process in Zaire, and 
the announcement of violence and conflict preluding the two Congo wars;  
 Language: selected studies were limited to French and English;  
 Focus on empirical data: we only selected studies presenting or relying on 
original empirical data. In addition, we not only included studies on Zaire/DRC, 
but also those referencing its connection to the broader region (Rwanda, 
Angola, Uganda, Congo-Brazzaville, Central African Republic (CAR), South 
Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia).  
 ‘Cutoff’ points: we used a cutoff point of the first 100 articles, as we observed 
that the relevance decreased substantially around this marker. 
 
We selected and tested a number of search strings in order to try to capture the 
various streams of literature treating conflict and violence in the DRC. Ultimately, we 
settled on seven broad streams, and duplicated each with Zaire and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo in order to incorporate the resources written before the country’s 
name was formally changed in 1997 with the overthrow of Mobutu. We used the 
selected strings, and screened the literature initially on title and abstract, before 
moving to the full text for selection. We applied these criteria on the following search 
strings:  
 “Democratic Republic of Congo” AND “Conflict” - “Zaire” AND “Conflict” 
 “Democratic Republic of Congo” AND Violen*2   - “Zaire” AND Violen*  
                                                     
2 Violen* was used to allow for the difference variances of the word (violence, violent etc. to 
be captured). Govern was used for the same purpose to capture related words such as 
governance, governing and government.  
          DRC Synthesis Paper  
9 
 
 
 “Democratic Republic of Congo” AND “Peace” - “Zaire” AND “Peace” 
 “Democratic Republic of Congo” AND Govern* - “Zaire” AND Govern* 
 “Democratic Republic of Congo” AND “Resource” – “Zaire” AND “Resource” 
 “Democratic Republic of Congo” AND “Intervention” – “Zaire” AND 
“Intervention”  
 “Democratic Republic of Congo” AND “Region” – “Zaire” AND “Region” 
 
However, after analysing the 424 selected resources, we noticed a number of 
limitations to this type of search, especially as it omitted a number of crucial texts 
which we think have been important in shaping ways of understanding violence and 
conflict in Congo among academics and policy-makers. We also observed that the 
works of very few Congolese authors (i.e. Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1998 & 2004; Mokoli, 
1997) were discovered during the initial search, with even fewer from authors still 
based in DRC (Bussy, 2016, Kapya Kabesa, 2009). Therefore, in the second stage of our 
qualitative systematic review, the snowball search, we relied on the existing database 
of the CRG, and broader resources from the bibliographies of our own research. The 
CRG database was built over the years by various Congo experts and missing data was 
added by the CRP Congo team during the literature review. The dataset is often used 
as a tool in our Congo research and new records are added regularly. It brings together 
relevant literature known to us through our own research and expertise as well as 
policy papers and reports of relevant think tanks, NGOs (Congolese organisations 
included) and governmental and inter-governmental organisations. We 
supplemented our initial data search findings with UN documentation (Security 
Council Resolutions, Secretary General Reports, Group of Expert Reports and Mapping 
Studies) and the work of many organisations with a track record of reports on Congo 
(including International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Institute for Security 
Studies, Amnesty International, International Alert, the Enough Project, Pole Institute, 
International Peace Information Service and Global Witness). We observed that there 
appears to be more grey literature on the Congo wars than there is academic 
literature. 
 
The search results give a good overview of the major debates within scholarship on 
Congo. Nevertheless, we observed that popular narratives are also reflected in the 
specific proportion of these narratives in the selected studies. Fifteen percent of the 
selected literature included studies on sexual and gender based violence, yet outside 
of this context there were only a few articles that focused on issues of justice (Vinck, 
2009; Klosterboer & Hartmann-Mahmud, 2013; Ndahinda, 2016), and these primarily 
had an international and transitional justice lens. Additionally, natural resources 
represent a considerable part of the selected records, covering a wide range of issues 
including economic incentives of armed groups, livelihoods, and resource governance. 
Other issues that occupy central stage in the literature are regional interventions and  
their humanitarian consequences, and more recently, peacekeeping, governance, 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform 
(SSR). Unsurprisingly, most of the literature focuses on dynamics in eastern DRC, 
indicating that the bulk of the DRC remains uncovered by research and analysis.  
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Two other gaps in the database results are significant for the purposes of the CRP. Few 
studies (Garrett, 2013; Matti, 2010; Rights & Accountability in Development, 2004; 
Raeymaekers, 2014; Vlassenroot et al., 2012) try to connect economic and political 
actors in local markets, and expand this analysis to the national and international 
sphere. The UN Group of Expert reports and investigative journalism has been much 
more successful in this regard. The database search produced even fewer studies 
(Carayannis, 2003; Gebrewold, 2009) that employ network analysis as a tool to 
understanding violence in the DRC. Our search revealed no studies that combine 
network analysis with the study of the political economy of public authority, thus 
combining economic, sociological and political analysis. This absence speaks to the 
significance and novelty of the approach that this paper proposes in producing 
evidence of local marketplaces and their broader linkages. 
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Dominant and Shifting Narratives 
 
For many observers, the Mobutu regime was considered a major constraint to stability 
and security in Central Africa. For a long time, it was also seen as a paradigmatic case 
of kleptocracy and the so-called “politics of the belly”. As will be discussed in the 
section on the political economy of public authority, most studies on Mobutu’s Zaire 
focused on the patrimonial nature of the Zairian state and the politics of patronage, 
predation and kleptocracy (Young, 1965; Young and Turner, 1985), on the role of Zaire 
in Cold War politics in Central Africa, and also on the gradual informalisation of the 
economic basis of patronage (MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga, 2000), which, it was 
argued, eventually led to a steady political disintegration and total collapse. 
 
Even if the Zairian regime was on the brink of collapse, it was not internal dynamics 
but the refugee crisis in Zaire caused by the Burundian civil war in 1993 and the 
Rwandan genocide in 1994 that triggered the final breakdown. When new rounds of 
mass violence started to spread in the Kivu provinces and the Mobutu regime showed 
no commitment to dealing with security threats coming from the refugee camps, a 
regional coalition, led by Rwanda and Uganda but involving several other countries in 
the region, started a military campaign to put an end to these security threats coming 
from eastern Zaire. It was the final blow to Mobutu’s regime, which had no effective 
way of countering this campaign and preventing its march to Kinshasa, bringing the 
long-time rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila to power. The power shift was originally 
believed to be further evidence of an African renaissance, with leaders such as 
Museveni, Afeworki, Zenawi and Kagame expressing a new form of leadership on the 
African continent. While largely an invasion of regional actors, for many the First 
Congo War was understood as a war of liberation, for some even echoing a pan-
Africanist ideology, part of which dates back to the time when Che Guevara 
(unsuccessfully) joined Kabila’s rebel forces in eastern Congo in the 1960s. The 
international community, which was taken by surprise by the effectiveness of this 
regional coalition, hardly responded to and even tacitly encouraged the Rwanda and 
Uganda-led military campaign in eastern Zaire (Carayannis, 2014). 
 
The first reports and studies published during or soon after the First Congo War mainly 
pointed to the interplay between local dynamics of conflict caused by the collapse of 
Mobutu’s rule and the cross-border effects of different crises in the region. A set of 
analyses of the First Congo War focused on local conflict dynamics, including identity 
politics, and on the precarious position of Kinyarwanda speaking communities in the 
Kivu provinces in particular (Willame, 1997; Reyntjens et al, 1996; Mamdani, 1997). 
One analysis, which was published soon after the start of the military campaign in 
September 1996, historicised the crisis and explained the effects of migration and land 
access mechanisms on local political competition (Reyntjens et al., 1996). At the time 
this was a very influential account, and it was soon followed by a CODESRIA report 
written by Mahmood Mamdani. While recognising the regional dimension of the 
Congo war and the spill-over effects of the Rwandan genocide (including the refugee 
flow and strategies of the post-genocide state), Mamdani argued that ‘at the root of  
          DRC Synthesis Paper  
12 
 
 
the political crisis in Congo is the crisis of the Congolese state’. For him, the crisis in 
eastern Congo was primarily the result of a crisis of citizenship, which he explained 
was bifurcated between civic and ethnic citizenship producing different and in some 
cases exclusive political and economic (land) rights (Mamdani, 1997). 
  
Other analyses emphasised the destabilising effects of a failed democratisation 
process in Zaire. As a Human Rights Watch report argued, ‘the conflict in eastern Zaire 
came as a culmination of policies of the Zairian government that sought to divert 
popular protest and challenges to its legitimacy by fanning ethnic and regional 
tensions’ (Human Rights Watch, 1997: 4). Lemarchand presented a regional 
perspective and pointed to the dynamics of state collapse and the direct links between 
refugee flows and insurgencies in Central Africa. As he argued, ‘diagnoses of the Congo 
crisis usually centre on two opposing sets of assumptions, neither of which carries the 
assurance of a cure. One focuses on Rwanda as the perennial spoiler; the other draws 
attention to a range of problems inherent in the DRC, including the inability of its 
leaders to lay the foundation of a functioning state’ (Lemarchand, 2013: 427).  He 
introduced the notion of ‘conflict-generating refugees’ and argued that ‘political 
exclusion (…) is the key to conflict identity formation in each state’ in Central Africa. 
As he continues, ‘in this kind of ethnically stratified pecking order lies an extraordinary 
potential for violence’. For Lemarchand, the core of the issue is the regional effects of 
what he describes as ‘ethnic fault-lines’, which cut across national boundaries and 
thus risk to produce spill-over effects of ethnically inspired violence (Lemarchand, 
1997). Of the studies that followed, most underscored a direct link between the 
regional spill-over effects of the Rwandan (and to a lesser extend the Burundian) 
conflict; the near collapse of the Mobutu regime; and the citizenship crisis affecting 
the Kinyarwanda speaking communities in the Kivus.  
 
After the start of the Second Congo War in 1998, the dominant narrative gradually 
shifted to a more direct focus on economic incentives guiding warring factions’ 
ambitions and strategies. The Second Congo War was seen as a direct invasion, aimed 
at consolidating control over Congo’s vast wealth of natural resources. The military 
fragmentation which soon followed the start of the war, was understood as a direct 
consequence of a regional power and resource struggle between national armies and 
their proxy rebel movements, armed groups and business and politico-military elites. 
One week after the start of the Second Congo war, these competing and economic 
agendas of warring parties were already recognised in a report published by the 
International Crisis Group (ICG). This report recognised these clashing agendas and 
the consequent military fragmentation as the core ingredients for what it feared 
would result in ‘the DRC imploding, producing a large-scale human disaster and a zone 
of major instability in the heart of Africa’ (ICG, 1998).  
 
The growing focus on Congo’s war economy following the second war also renewed 
international attention on the role of private military companies and criminal 
networks in conflict areas. Concepts including military entrepreneurship (Perrot, 
1999; Perrot et al, 2012) and elite networks (UN Panel of Experts, 2002) were 
introduced to frame both the nature of armed struggle and the aims and strategies of  
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belligerents and their supporters. It all reinforced the increasing belief that Congo was 
‘cursed’ by its riches, that greed was the main conflict motive, and that armed groups 
were using revenues from the exploitation and trade of natural resources to finance 
their war efforts and to enrich themselves (Cuvelier et al, 2014; Laudati, 2013; 
Nabudere, 2004; Montague, 2002; Samset, 2002, Miho, 2010). The Congo wars also 
became a key point of reference in the more general and vivid debate on the role of 
resources in explaining armed groups’ behaviour. For some protagonists, the rapacity 
or greed of armed actors for natural resource revenues was increasingly understood 
as a key factor in explaining the onset and persistence of armed conflict (Berdal and 
Malone, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005).  
 
In the case of the Congo wars, followers of the greed account eventually also saw a 
direct link between the search for resources and the devastating increase in sexual 
violence, which became a very persuasive and mobilising narrative, despite its 
simplicity. As it was suggested, rape became ‘a systemic, even rational occurrence in 
a system that has been built upon violence’ (Carpenter, cited in Seay, 2011). It inspired 
the UN Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Congo in 2010 to describe DRC 
as the ‘rape capital of the world’ (Wallstrom, 2010). For some time, this narrative 
proved so powerful and attracted so much international attention that it dominated 
the discourse on DRC entirely, and left hardly any space for alternative readings of the 
Congo wars. At the same time, while mobilising additional funds, it narrowed the focus 
of humanitarian responses to issues related to sexual violence, which was considered 
‘as a single-cause, single-type phenomenon (rape caused by conflict), without taking 
the complex context into consideration’ (Douma et al, 2016: VI).  
 
A leading source for the documentation of Congo’s war economies became the UN 
Panel of Experts and UN Group of Experts reports. In 2000, the UN Security Council 
appointed a panel of experts tasked with analysing the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources and other forms of wealth of DRC and the links with the continuation of the 
conflict. In its final report of October 2002 (UN Panel of Experts, 2002), it introduced 
the notion of elite networks and distinguished three main networks: one controlled 
by the Kinshasa government and the others by either Uganda or Rwanda. In 2004, the 
Group of Experts was established, which originally had to monitor the implementation 
of the sanctions regime in eastern Congo, but since its start also gathered information 
and analysis on the national, regional and international support networks to armed 
groups and criminal networks. These reports became key sources of information of 
the different actors in the networks involved in Congo’s war economy and those 
political, military and business elites who took part in it, yet they stopped short of 
analysing how these networks operate, shift and adapt. The same reports also 
entailed a great deal of controversy, not only because of the detailed information 
about the shady business deals of a number of well-known multinationals, but also 
because of the empirical evidence supporting the personal involvement of several 
prominent politicians and heads of state from neighbouring countries in the control 
over Congo’s resources (Cuvelier et al, 2014). 
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A key role in the further reduction of armed conflict to a quest for natural resources 
was played by a number of advocacy groups, including Global Witness, Human Rights 
Watch, Amnesty International and later on also the Enough Project and the Eastern 
Congo Initiative. Reports tried to document the incentives of armed factions, as well 
as to point at the direct consequences of the struggle for resources. Detailed accounts 
were published about the coltan and cassiterite commodity chains, the involvement 
of armed groups and the devastating consequences of protracted violence. At the 
same time, these advocacy groups expressed their worries and indignation about the 
failure of the international community to prevent key players in the Congolese conflict 
from continuing to finance their war efforts through the illegal sale of minerals and 
timber on the international market. This dominant narrative suggested a 
straightforward solution: it was increasingly argued that the easiest and most effective 
way to end the conflict was to prevent armed groups from making money through the 
sale of minerals from the areas under their control. It proved to be a powerful and 
convincing narrative in policy circles, with a plethora of initiatives being developed to 
reduce the role of natural resources in fuelling violence in eastern DRC, and thus the 
potential for further conflict. As one observer put it, ‘the number of supply chain 
monitoring initiatives alone [...] has become almost as dizzying as the list of armed 
groups involved in the conflict’ (Kinniburgh, 2014). The focus on resources has 
gradually been accompanied by international coverage paying attention to mass 
numbers of rape victims and mass rape by armed groups.  
 
These popular narratives, in the end, have produced a very narrow and reductionist 
perspective on conflict and violence in DRC. ‘[T]hree narratives have dominated the 
discourse on the Congo and oriented the intervention strategies. These narratives 
focus on a primary cause of violence, the illegal exploitation of natural resources; a 
main consequence, sexual abuse against women and girls; and a central solution, 
reconstructing state authority’ (Autesserre, 2012). As she states, these narratives have 
overlooked ‘the myriad other causes, such as land conflict, poverty, corruption, local 
political and social antagonisms, and hostile relationships between state officials, 
including security forces, and the general population’. This reductionist narrative 
occurred despite the existence of a rich academic literature on the multi-layered 
causes and consequences of violence and conflict in DRC.   
 
Some of the rich academic literature on the multi-layered causes and consequences 
of violence and conflict in DRC provides more fine-grained evidence on the nature and 
strategies of power networks controlling (parts) of the commodity chains of key 
minerals. Other studies have focused on the larger political economy of the Congo 
wars. In academia, some controversy exists on the assumed links between natural 
resources and conflict, with some studies affirming that the motivation and feasibility 
of resource exploitation largely explain why external military contingents have 
remained active in the country since August 1998 (Samset, 2002, Miho, 2010). Other 
studies point to the flaws in this ‘greed account’ and argue that the exploitation and 
trading of natural resources is an outcome, rather than a cause, of conflict (Perks, 
2010). Empirical data also reveals that a wide spectrum of resource extraction 
scenarios has been functioning with varying degrees of influence on conflict dynamics  
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in eastern DRC (Perks, 2010). Not all of these scenarios involve armed actors; nor do 
they all engender violence.  
 
Over the years, natural resources have also been considered an opportunity for 
development rather than a cause of conflict (Garrett, 2013). At the same time, the 
resource narrative has been corrected with a particular attention to how governance 
conditions extraction sites and the direct links between resources, patronage and 
power (Garrett et al., 2009; Cuvelier et al. 2013; Geenen, 2012; Geenen, 2013).  As will 
be discussed in greater detail below, academic attention also gradually expanded to 
the larger governance context, informing and being informed by a context of 
protracted conflict. Moving away from a direct focus on the links between resources 
and conflict, some authors argue that conflict shapes existing institutional contexts, 
as it creates new opportunities for (transborder) power networks to gain access to 
resources yet also to modify and exploit regulatory frameworks (Raeymaekers, 2009; 
Raeymakers et al, 2009; Titeca, 2011). This literature starts from a focus on processes, 
dynamics and outcomes of daily governance, and points to the increasingly hybrid 
nature of governance that not only contributes to violence and conflict, but at the 
same time can have a stabilising effect.   
 
As a consequence of the ‘M23 crisis’, during which a Tutsi-led group in November 2012 
succeeded in taking control of the strategic eastern city of Goma, causing a major blow 
to both the Kinshasa government and the peacebuilding efforts of the international 
community, the dominant policy narrative shifted to what was described as the ‘root 
causes’ of the crisis. Scholars and policymakers alike recognised that the protracted 
character of the Congo crisis was due to regional dynamics and a governance crisis at 
the national level, together with a number of unaddressed local issues with land 
access cited as one of the dominant local sources of conflict. A coalition of 
international NGOs expressed to the UN Secretary General their concern over the 
mandate of MONUSCO, the UN peacekeeping mission in DRC, which neglected 
alternative routes of conflict resolution including ‘local level dialogue to address the 
local issues of conflict and community grievances’ (IRIN, 2013). The M23 crisis 
provoked the international community to revise its approach and recognise the 
multiple layers of conflict, resulting in a Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework 
agreement for the DRC and the region signed in February 2013 in Addis Ababa by the 
major international and regional actors. Academic scholarship, however, pointed to 
the limits of internationally supported conflict resolution strategies in DRC and 
connected this to the larger debate in academic literature on the ‘local turn’ in 
peacebuilding (Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015), which had also become dominant in 
other conflict-affected regions, including Afghanistan.  
 
According to Autesserre, the neglect of local causes and dynamics of conflict helps 
explain why violence continues in DRC. Local violence, she argues, ‘was motivated not 
only by top-down causes, regional or national, but also by bottom-up tensions. Local 
agendas have held tremendous influence throughout modern Congolese history, and 
they have often been intertwined with macro-level dimensions’ (Autesserre,2010:38).  
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As a consequence, she states that only by shifting the focus to ‘local actors’ can peace 
and prosperity be brought to DRC. This narrative, which indeed came to be  
 
widespread with international organisations, has offered an attractive alternative to 
policy actors, yet it tends to ignore the contested, dynamic, and interconnected nature 
of the ‘local’ and the multiple ways in which local, national and regional dynamics are 
interwoven (Stearns et al, 2017). At the same time, this argument ignores the extreme 
variety and messiness of local issues at stake. One example is land disputes, which are 
deeply connected to national politics and embedded in a complex interaction 
between land laws, patronage politics, the failure of justice mechanisms and socio-
economic interdependencies (Ansoms et al, 2014; Huggins and Clover, 2005).  As can 
be observed in other conflict areas, rather than providing an alternative way of 
thinking and new opportunities for intervention, the raising of awareness of ‘the local’ 
thus risks reducing both the reading of and responses to conflict and violence.  
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The Political Economy of Public Authority in DRC 
 
We start our analysis from an understanding of public authority as an ‘instance of 
power which seeks at least a minimum of voluntary compliance and thus is legitimated 
in some way’ (Lund, 2006). As Hoffmann and Kirk have argued, ‘public authority must 
be consistently practiced or performed by those claiming it’ (Hoffmann and Kirk, 
2013). As a consequence, we see public authority as contextually contingent and as 
always in production, and as entailing a high level of competition and contestation, 
particularly in conflict settings. 
 
There is little Congo-specific literature on the political economy of public authority as 
conceptualised by the CRP. This is partly the result of the fact that the academic 
debate only recently began to focus on public authority, both as a corrective to the 
‘failed states literature’ and the normative and technical assumptions supporting it, 
and as an outcome of the hybrid governance debate that emerged from it (Meagher 
et al., 2014). However, when looking into the rich literature on the nature and 
functioning of the Zairian state, a number of contributions can be identified that help 
us to understand how power was shaped and already largely contested and 
fragmented before the start of the First Congo War (Reno, 1998; Schatzberg, 1981; 
Callaghy, 1984; Young and Turner, 1985). In the 1980s, Callaghy argued that ‘the 
central state apparatus attempted to cope with the uncertainty produced by a 
complex and shifting rural periphery’, in which there were ‘traditional, quasi-
traditional, and transitional local authorities and groups to deal with, all in the context 
of intricate patterns of local factionalism produced by the ‘interplay of identity and 
utility’ and the patron-client and brokerage networks that frequently link the local 
area with higher levels’ (Callaghy, 1984: 62).  
 
Mobutu’s political regime has been framed as a paradigmatic case of kleptocracy and 
patrimonial rule. It was built around the trade of rents for political loyalty, thus 
transforming economic assets into a stock of political resources, with a patronage 
network as a redistribution structure. As Tull argues, ‘the political perseverance of the 
Mobutu system of rule found its basis in the intricate networks of redistribution, 
linking the highest echelons of state hierarchy vertically with local power holders. (...) 
These networks were usually underfed by offering opportunities and means to access 
resources, rather than resources as such’ (Tull, 2005: 277). The provision of stability 
to a ruling class, combined with a constant process of elite recycling and foreign 
support, prevented the development of a counter-force and undergirded regime 
stability. Yet, Mobutu’s patrimonialism also paved the way to officially ‘sanctioned’ 
private accumulation, which, in turn, paved the way for the gradual fragmentation of 
central public authority and emergence of decentralised networks centred around key 
resources including diamonds, gold and transborder trade (Reno, 1999). State 
institutions were forced to constantly negotiate and compete with alternative 
instances of authority and economic production to safeguard their interests and 
control. ‘While the state depended upon those wielding power in ‘informal’ networks  
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of social and economic control, the same networks depended on the state to 
consolidate their own mechanisms of control and distribution’ (Vlassenroot and 
Raeymaekers, 2008).    
 
This body of literature analysing public authority and state fragmentation under 
Mobutu has shown that even though the Congolese state has often been framed as a 
‘failed state’, there is no shortage of authorities, regulation and governance. In fact, a 
plethora of state and non-state actors, which are seen as at least partially legitimate 
by Congolese populations, are engaged in exercising public authority and delivering 
social services (Trefon, 2009; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2008; Tull, 2005; Seay, 
2009). This literature has been a source of inspiration, both empirically and 
analytically, to the study of current governance conditions and the shaping of public 
authority.  Scholars have recently studied the actual governance practices of a wide 
variety of different state and non-state actors and organisations (Cuvelier and 
Bashwira, 2016; de Herdt and and Titeca, 2010; Hoffmann and Vlassenroot, 2014; 
Hoffmann et al., 2016; Mudinga and Ansoms, 2015; Schouten, 2016; Titeca, 2009; 
Titeca and de Herdt, 2011; Titeca et al., 2013; Vlassenroot et al., 2016). These actors 
include faith-based civil society organisations (Seay, 2009, 2013); business networks 
(Raeymaekers, 2010; 2014); the education sector (de Herdt and Titeca, 2016); armed 
groups (Titeca, 2010; Hoffmann and Vlassenroot, 2014; Hoffmann et al., 2016; Tull, 
2005); the Congolese army (Verweijen, 2013); churches (Titeca et al., 2013); the public 
administration (de Herdt, 2011; Englebert, 2012; Englebert and Tull, 2013; Trefon, 
2009; 2010; Mughendi and Namegabe, 2015); the justice sector (Rubbers and Gallez, 
2012; Gallez and Rubbers, 2015); urban-based ‘big-men’ (Büscher, 2012) and urban 
land governance (Wagemagers, 2014; Van Overbeek, 2014a, b; Nyenyezi and Ansoms, 
2014, UCBC, 2017). At the same time, research on public authority shows that it is 
subject to high levels of contestation, competition and conflict. Rather than a collapse 
or absence of public authority, there is thus a high level of fragmentation of public 
authority and sovereignty. The fragmentation of sovereignty has been particularly 
pronounced in the eastern regions of the country, where shifting militarised power 
networks compete, often linked to or embedded in ethnic communities that are 
struggling over power, territory and resources (Nest et al., 2006; Roessler and 
Verhoeven, 2016; Samset, 2002; Singo, 2015; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004). 
 
While research in Congo has clearly shown that an absence of central state authority 
does not imply disorder and illegitimate governance, it also reveals that the current 
situation of fragmented public authority and sovereignty is generative of high levels 
of conflict, insecurity, instability and uncertainty. Those networks that assume the 
mantle of public authority in Congo are highly flexible, fluid and unstable due to the 
ever-changing patterns of strategic alliances and loyalties (e.g. Büscher, 2012). In 
general, it can be observed that Congo’s fragmented public authority and sovereignty 
encompasses multiple centres of power and power networks that maintain variegated 
ties to the political centre. Due to continuous competition and realignments, the 
relations between the political centre and local centres of power, as well as those 
within the latter category, are relatively fluid and shifting constantly (Vlassenroot and  
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Raeymaekers, 2008).  In addition, different networks try both to operate from within 
the state as well as to keep parallel mechanisms of access and control in place. 
 
Unpredictability generates a context of insecurity and vulnerability that affects 
everyone in the Congolese polity. Congolese ‘big men’ live in perpetual fear of losing 
the wealth and status they have accumulated and ultimately their security in the 
ubiquitous power struggles they participate in. At the same time, many ordinary 
Congolese live in fear of losing their scarce resources and being disavowed by those 
controlling access to these resources. Indeed, several publications show that power 
relations between rulers and ruled in Congo constantly oscillate between protection 
rackets and more genuine social contracts where there is a minimum of reciprocity 
through mutual recognition of rights and obligations (e.g. Raeymaekers, 2010; 
Hoffmann et al., 2016). A crucial lesson from the Congolese case is that public 
authority is highly fluctuating in areas going through conflict and political turmoil as 
different power networks move in and out of capacity to rule in accordance with the 
dynamics of the political struggles. This shows that public authority is a product of 
specific political processes – in which violence and the threat thereof play a significant 
role – rather than something that can simply be attributed to the state.  
 
That said, little is known about the logics of public authority and how these logics 
interact and shape patterns of conflict and violence. With respect to the political 
marketplace we lack data about the functioning of the power networks that dominate 
it or compete for access, the transactions within it, competition and alliance formation 
between networks, how different scales connect, and how strategies are guided by 
the three logics. We also do not know enough about the connections between the 
logic of the political marketplace and patterns of conflict and violence. Concerning 
citoyenneté, we lack knowledge about how Congolese leadership rules through 
citoyenneté and the extent to which citoyenneté actually reduces violence and 
conflict. In order to promote peace and justice in DRC, it is paramount that we identify 
the conditions under which citoyenneté emerges, where it succeeds in its goals and 
what undermines it. The role of moral populism, or exclusivist policies, in conflict 
dynamics has been studied quite extensively, in particular moral populism based on 
ethnic identity. However, while it is generally accepted that ethnic-based moral 
populism plays an important role in politics and conflict – in particular land and other 
resource conflicts – and that patronage power networks are often closely linked to 
particular ethnic communities, we lack data about the specific correlations between 
moral populism, the political marketplace and conflict and violence. Understanding 
the conditions that facilitate moral populism and transactional politics to lead to 
violence can help improve peacebuilding and conflict resolution. 
 
The Congolese Political Marketplace 
 
One of the salient features of public authority in Congo is the porousness of the divide 
between the public and the private domain. There is broad consensus among 
researchers that public authority is largely exercised through patronage or power 
networks that transcend conventional dichotomies of public/private, state/society,  
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formal/informal and modern/traditional. Patron-client ties often revolve around the 
exchange of loyalty and resources for ‘protection’. They are grounded in personal 
power relations, often described and perceived in familial metaphors. Rather than 
following administrative boundaries, these capillary networks are spread throughout 
various sectors of society. Moreover, research clearly shows that these networks 
transcend conventional scalar divisions and administrative boundaries such as local, 
national and sub-regional and are connected to global spheres. The ‘big men’ situated 
at the summit of these capillary networks continuously compete, struggle and fight 
for control over people, territory and resources, which push them to enter into 
unstable alliances with other ‘big men’ (de Koning, 2012; Titeca et al., 2013). Similar 
processes are observed at the local level.  
 
During the 32-year reign (1965-1997) of former president Mobutu, he and the shifting 
members of his inner circle reduced politics to a search for resources. This inner circle 
tried to institute full control over the self-created political marketplace, or ‘a system 
of governance run on the basis of personal transactions in which political services and 
allegiances are exchanged for material reward in a competitive manner’ (de Waal, 
2016: 1). Yet, with the dwindling of income to the political centre (itself the result of 
economic collapse), the ruling network was increasingly contested by individual 
members, who tried to reduce their dependence on the political centre through the 
control of informal and lucrative trading activities.  
 
The fall of the Mobutu regime set in motion a profound change in the functioning of 
this political marketplace, which increasingly fragmented into relatively autonomous 
centres of competition. The collapse of the centre made room for the further 
emergence of local ‘big men’ and alternative (transborder) power networks. This 
fragmentation was particularly acute in eastern Congo. Here, from 1996 onwards 
power was largely exercised through three newly established political-military power 
networks, some with links to Kinshasa and others to the Rwandan and Ugandan 
regimes. These power networks struggled bitterly for sovereignty over territory, 
people and resources (Samset, 2002; Le Billon, 2008). The result was the emergence 
of a militarised political economy, which was shaped by coercion, the military control 
of key sites of revenue generation, including production sites, marketplaces, border 
posts, and infrastructural nodes, forced monopolies, coercive resource extraction, 
price fixing and plunder and assets stripping (UN Group of Experts, 2002, 2003, 2004).  
 
The peace process that started in 2003 and concluded with presidential and 
parliamentary elections in 2006 forced these networks to revise their strategies and 
reconfigured the politico-military order. Mobilising renewed international recognition 
and winning the elections, the Congolese presidential power network could gradually 
increase its control and solidify its sovereignty. Although armed groups continued to 
proliferate in the eastern parts and also started to operate in other parts of the 
country, these groups did not pose any serious existential threat to the political 
centre. This can be explained either as a result of the relative loss of regional support 
or of the capacity of the political centre to co-opt them. The presidential network has 
been able to control the political marketplace to a much greater extent than was the  
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case during the Congo wars. Most of the alternative power networks preferred to be 
co-opted rather than compete with the presidential network, while individual 
leaderships tried to increase pressure indirectly via the mobilisation of localised armed 
actors, not to challenge the presidential network but to gain better access to it. In 
addition, despite the continued fighting in eastern DRC, the east, including its 
resources, seems to be of marginal importance to the political and economic survival 
of the president’s network.  
 
Nevertheless, even though this network managed to gradually extend its authority 
over areas previously controlled by semi-autonomous and militarised power networks 
formed during the Congo wars, its penetration remains highly uneven and contested 
by local elites and populations. A number of locally embedded parallel power 
networks—second tier networks— are still capable of challenging the regime, though 
only at a local level. In eastern Congo these can partly be traced back to the militarised 
networks the emerged during the Second Congo War (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 
2008). A well-known and particularly influential cluster of such second-tier networks 
grew out of the former rebel movement Rassemblement congolais pour la 
démocratie/Kisangani-Mouvement de Libération (RCD/K-ML, Congolese Rally for 
Democracy/Kisangani-Liberation Movement), which continued to dominate in the 
local administration and security agencies (Raeymaekers, 2014). This cluster has been 
in conflict with the presidential network over important posts in the local 
administration, which provides strong impetus to current conflict dynamics in the Beni 
region (Verweijen, 2016b).  
 
Some of the other prominent power networks, which continue to operate with some 
autonomy, are linked to Banyarwanda elites in North Kivu. One of these networks has 
a strong military component to it, which regroups officers from the former RCD-Goma 
rebel groups, part of which were integrated into the army in 2003. By 2011, more than 
half of the command positions in North and South Kivu were held by officers from this 
group. These Rwandan-backed elites have regularly been in open conflict with the 
presidential network and its local allies. This has led to repeated rebellions culminating 
in the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) rebellions in 2009 and 
the M23 rebellion in 2012, both of which were only successfully resisted through a 
mixture of international diplomatic pressure, regional compromises and military 
intervention by MONUC/MONUSCO. The Hutu-based network in particular tries to 
consolidate its local power position relying on different strategies towards the political 
centre.  
 
One of the results of the way army integration was undertaken and of the different 
survival strategies of the different networks, is a highly fragmented Congolese army. 
It was formed after the second war out of different warring factions, yet today consists 
of a collection of competing and overlapping power networks across the country, 
which are both subservient to and in conflict with the formal hierarchy. This has in 
turn created an ambiguous relationship with the Maison Militaire, the presidential 
military office. Within these complex patron-client relations, loyalty, support, and the 
provision of certain services are exchanged for access to resources and protection  
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(Eriksson Baaz and Olsson, 2011; Hoffmann et al., 2016; de Vries, 2015; Stearns et al., 
2013; Verweijen, 2015, 2016b; Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, 2013).  
 
Patronage is also one of the crucial ways in which rural militias, including Mai-Mai 
groups in the east and politico-religious groups like the Bundu Dia Kongo (BDK) and 
Vuvamu in the west, are able to establish public authority and forge connection to 
larger power networks. Their power is often based around the exchange of loyalty and 
resources for ‘protection’. In conflict-affected zones, these groups may, for example, 
protect the property of economic operators by escorting their convoys. In other cases, 
they protect illegal business activities by persuading or pressurising state agents not 
to interfere. Rural armed groups also frequently provide support to their clients when 
these have a dispute, intimidating or even punishing the opposing camp (Vlassenroot 
et al., 2016). Yet, in order to be able to grant such advantages, militia leaders are 
constantly in search of influential protectors themselves. In particular, they need a 
parapluie (umbrella), or protection from high-ranking politicians and officials, who can 
use their clout to apply pressure on local political actors – a widespread technique of 
government known as traffic d’influence (influence peddling). A prominent example is 
Mai-Mai leader Bede Rusagara, who used to operate in the Ruzizi Plain in Uvira 
territory. By mobilising his parapluie in Bukavu and Kinshasa, Bede was able to 
influence decision-making processes in the local administration. In this way, he helped 
his clients obtain land plots and jobs, or exonerated them from judicial persecution 
(Verweijen, 2016a).  
 
Land disputes in the western province of Kongo Central are another illustration of how 
local and national elites interact to reinforce their position and interests. In the 
western coastal town of Muanda, Congo’s only onshore and offshore oil producing 
area to date (on the border with Angola), local elites have been engaged in a land-
grabbing dispute with rural villagers in Muanda Village. Members of the provincial 
elite successively mobilised the president’s network to ensure that the courts upheld 
colonial-era documentation giving them the rightful claim to village land, and 
authorised the arrest of the village chief. Moreover, Chinese business companies 
looking for land to cultivate and for greater access to commercial fishing have added 
an international dimension to local influence peddling (Bazonzi and Carayannis, 2017). 
 
The expansion of industrial mining in eastern Congo also provides a good illustration 
of the trans-scalar nature of power networks in Congo and how they operate. After 
the formal end of the war in 2003, international mining companies such as Banro, 
CASA and AngloGold began activities on their concessions in eastern Congo. However, 
it has been extremely challenging for these companies to navigate the complex 
environment of eastern Congo where they face difficulties related to insecurity, 
resistance and discontent from people depending on artisanal mining activities, and 
competing networks that vie for the revenues and other benefits that accrue to the 
presence of international companies (Geenen and Claessens, 2013; Geenen, 2014; 
Geenen and Hönke, 2014; Verweijen, 2017). The dynamics of the power struggles 
surrounding industrial mining are characterised by complex negotiations, the politics 
of patronage and co-optation that tend toward relationships of rivalry and alliance  
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across groups for redistribution of wealth through services, gifts, and performances of 
collective contestation or celebration.  
 
‘Citoyenneté’ 
 
DRC has a long history of community based engagement and mobilisation inspired by 
an ideology of citoyenneté, which we use in this paper as an emic replacement of the 
overall CRP concept of civicness. This citoyenneté is both part of a formal ideology of 
nation-building and a framework of resistance against it. It is a guiding motive of 
strategies and actions induced by the regime and a key principle of forms of resistance 
as well as initiatives to respond to the void left by the state in providing public goods 
and services. One of the characteristics of Mobutu’s rule was the redefinition and 
‘Zairianisation’ of citoyenneté, aimed at promoting the development of a Zairian 
nation, yet recognising its specific features and local realities. It was a term invented 
to instil a sense of nationalist pride and duty towards the one-party state and Mobutu 
himself into the Zairian citizenry. A manifestation of citoyenneté was salongo, which 
was the mobilisation of the entire population into obligatory civic work. Although in 
most cases it was met with limited popular enthusiasm and even resistance, it 
continues to exist until today, even in rebel-controlled areas where rebel leaderships 
rely on similar strategies to mobilise the population. The Kabila regime has made 
reference to this citoyenneté, and in 2015 launched its ‘programme d’initiation à la 
nouvelle citoyenneté’, which was explained as ‘un processus d’intériorisation qui peut 
permettre à des personnes ou groupes de quitter un état de conscience inférieur pour 
atteindre un état de conscience supérieur. Elle répond à la nécessité de redonner au 
peuple congolais une identité collective, une conscience politique et des valeurs qui 
cimentent la quintessence de la nation’ (Mende, Press Statement, June 2015)3. 
 
The same notion of citoyenneté, however, has also motivated non-state actors to 
engage in the provision of public goods, as well as inspired different forms of 
resistance. Under Mobutu, the opportunity ‘to get rich quickly’ almost became a new 
state ideology, and it engendered different forms of reaction. One was the so-called 
‘Article 15’, or the necessity to fend for oneself (‘l’auto prise en charge de la 
population’), which was tolerated by the regime in return for non-legitimated and 
rapacious state predation. This ‘fend-for-yourself’ attitude of Mobutism served as 
social pact between state and society, as it ‘allowed the former to retire from public 
life and from its functions, leaving the latter the possibility to act unlawfully’ (Jourdan, 
2004: 170). While this attitude could be considered a crucial part of Zairian 
citoyenneté, the end result was a sanctioning of self-interested opportunism in all 
spheres of life, and a conditioning of the population to the absence of the state. It is 
also actively propagated by state officials themselves, particularly in how local 
populations are forced to seek for their own protection out of lack of will or capacity  
                                                     
3 An approximate English translation is, “A process of internalization that can allow individuals 
or groups to leave a lower state of consciousness in order to attain a higher state of 
consciousness. It responds to the need to give back to the Congolese people a collective 
identity, a political conscience and values that cement the essence of the nation.” 
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of state security services to do so. Conditioning people to accept the state’s 
abrogation of its responsibilities is present in official discourse of administrators and 
state representatives at all levels of society.  
 
We see a similar co-optation of the citoyenneté concept today by pro-democracy 
youth groups like Lucha and Filimbi. These have re-appropriated the concepts of 
Salongo (community service) and citoyenneté and spend weekends cleaning public 
streets and picking up neighbourhood garbage (public services no longer performed 
by the state) as acts of resistance. At the same time, it is as ‘citizens’ that they press 
the Congolese state to take its responsibility and provide services to Congo’s 
population. These citizen movements ‘rebel’ via non-violent popular mobilisation in 
their search for political reform and good governance. 
 
Surprisingly, withering state capacity and political fragmentation did not lead to a 
complete governance void, but rather it has opened up space for other actors, 
including traditional chiefs, civil society groups, churches and aid agencies, to assume 
services previously delivered by the state. Since the 1980s, state sovereignty has been 
undergoing a gradual process of ‘informal privatisation’, with non-state actors 
increasingly competing with the state to fill in its gaps.  These new actors gradually 
made their way into what Lund has described as ‘active sites of political negotiation 
and mediation over the implementation of public goals or the distribution of public 
authority in which local and regional identities and power relations are reshaped and 
recast’ (Lund 2006: 686). This explains why today education, health and other services 
are almost entirely outsourced and controlled by a multitude of non-state actors 
including churches, civil society groups and non-governmental development 
organisations that started mushrooming at the end of the 1980s. The same civil 
society actors referred to citoyenneté to make their claims for democracy and civil 
rights. This all said, social services remain a site of resource accumulation, with non-
state providers in most cases depending on their capacity to negotiate a settlement 
with state institutions or representatives in return for rents. 
 
While there is a body of literature on citoyenneté as a part of Mobutist ideology, there 
is little research on citoyenneté in more recent years despite the fact that it remains a 
key feature of public authority in DRC that a plethora of non-state actors and quasi-
state actors de facto substitute for the state in various spheres of public life and in 
service delivery. In this sense they perform and invoke a ‘language of stateness’ 
(including the right to provide services) in their day-to-day strategies and practices of 
government (cf. Hansen and Stepputat, 2001; Hoffmann et al., 2016). Today these 
actors also include armed groups, vigilante groups, local and international NGOs, and 
various UN agencies and MONUSCO. Alongside these organisations today, there are a 
variety of state agencies that work more or less autonomously. 
 
The governance practises of these actors and organisations are to some extent 
regulated by values and norms that recognise the respect and integrity of citizens – 
although to highly varying degrees. Part of the reason for that is that the morality of 
patronage practices in Congo includes an ethos of care, solidarity and reciprocity even  
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among armed groups and the Congolese army, which are often framed as purely 
predatory actors. Although highly asymmetric, the relationship between patrons and 
clients in Congo is rarely purely predatory. Instead, it entails elements of reciprocity, 
for just as clients are expected to offer loyalty, support, favours and gifts to their 
patrons, so too their patrons are supposed to provide something in return such as job 
opportunities, different kinds of protection, and material support. Patrons who fail to 
deliver services do so at their own peril as they risk losing the support of their clients 
and allies.  While the presidential patronage network may on the surface appear to be 
resilient to the loss of popular support, thus suggesting that ‘clients and allies’ are not 
directly correlated to popular support, it is vulnerable to public pressure. It bowed to 
public pressure to improve the conditions of Congolese expelled from Angola, and the 
complete lack of support for amending the constitution to allow the president to sit 
for a third term has repeatedly frustrated the regime’s effort to maintain the 
dominance of its power network, leading it to resort increasingly to the use of force. 
So, client support matters.  
 
From an ideological standpoint, patronage practices in Congo are grounded in 
paternal and family values, which are pervasive in the imageries of political authority 
and order in Congo (Schatzberg, 1988). However, it is crucial to note that patronage is 
a Janus-faced mode of public authority. On the one hand, patrons are expected to 
provide for the wellbeing and security of their clients, but on the other hand, the 
authority of the patron also expresses an unequal status, as the stern patron is 
authorised to correct and control his/her clients, and to take decisions on their behalf. 
Along these lines some authors also suggest that there may be correlations between 
the patriarchal values of patronage, militarised masculinity and sexual violence in 
Congo (Le Roux, 2014; Meger, 2012). Moreover, it is important to note that the trust 
and reciprocity that exist in patronage networks are primarily cultivated among 
individuals and kinship members (Vlassenroot, 2004). In this regard it is indicative that 
‘customary chiefs’ are sometimes referred to as the fathers and protectors of their 
ethnic communities. However, we do not know nearly enough about when and how 
patronage produces citoyenneté or conversely domination, exploitation and coercion. 
We also do not know enough about the role of women and women’s movements in 
citoyenneté, although Congolese women have been very active in pushing for peace 
in rural and urban locations.  Which women, where, what are their issues, and how do 
they try and intersect with and influence political decisions within the political 
marketplace, are important questions. Consequently, it is of crucial importance to 
study this Janus-faced form of public authority in further detail. Also, some have 
written that Congolese public institutions often officially subscribe to the deontology 
of the state in protecting the Congolese citizens and their goods, but that they find it 
difficult to respect these values due to poor working conditions and lack of resources 
(Trefon, 2009). But again, more knowledge is needed about when and how 
citoyenneté emerges among state agents and in relation to whom. Is it mainly towards 
friends, colleagues, relatives and co-ethnics, or does it extend further? 
 
Also, to what extent do non-state actors such as armed groups and development 
organisations produce citoyenneté? Some armed groups, indeed, try to mobilise  
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popular support through a discourse based on a number of largely shared social 
values. In some cases, this produces a degree of citoyenneté between armed groups 
and the people they govern. One example is the Kifuafua armed group in Walikale, 
which provides a modicum of public services in return for the taxes they impose on 
people. However, again, this seems to be connected to the fact that the Kifuafua have 
either familial or other close personal relations with the people in the area they 
operate (Hoffmann et al., 2016).  Citoyenneté is integral to the moral grid of local and 
international NGOs. There is a huge variety of international NGOs in Congo and an 
almost infinite number of local NGOs. Many of these local NGOs have a specific 
mandate to work on peace, governance and human rights, while others combine 
operations in the peace sector with humanitarian and development activities, 
including resource governance (Martin et al., 2011; Burt et al., 2011).  
 
The emergence of many of these local organisations coincided with the emergence of 
multi-party politics in DRC and the beginning of the country’s democratisation process 
in the early 1990s, which resulted in an opening of the political space. Today, the 
operations carried out by local NGOs focus mainly on local conflict management 
(family feuds and land-related disputes), with the two most commonly cited 
approaches being building awareness and strengthening capacities for action 
(Morvan, 2010). Some scholarship analyses the effectiveness of NGO efforts to treat 
victims of sexual violence (Roka et al., 2014; Rowaan, 2011; Le Roux, 2014), but there 
is surprisingly little academic research published on how NGOs operate and the effects 
thereof in Congo (Freedman, 2014, 2016). There are, however, a number of policy 
reports on NGO impact, which in most cases concentrate on eastern Congo (Morvan, 
2010; Romkema, 2001; Gouzou and Van der Schoot, 2006; Romkema and Vlassenroot, 
2007; Douma and Hilhorst, 2012). 
 
While some argue that civil society institutions provide superior public goods than 
state services (Seay 2013), there is a pressing need to study the political economy of 
public authority and how the three logics are manifested under civil society 
governance. It should not be assumed from the outset that humanitarian, 
development or peacebuilding actors necessarily practice citoyenneté. They may also 
be privy to the logics of the political marketplace and moral populism. For instance, 
some have argued that the international humanitarian presence in North Kivu 
reinforced competition over Goma’s political and socio-economic space (Büscher and 
Vlassenroot, 2010). Similarly, Hoffmann et al. (2016) argue that attempts to improve 
security provision in Bunia city by international and local NGOs created further 
competition in the field of security governance (see also Lischer, 2003). It is thus 
crucially important to study the extent to which NGOs and other members of civil 
society actually govern through the logic of citoyenneté and when they falter and why 
they do so. As Seay (2013: 95) points out: ‘More research is needed into patronage in 
health-care delivery systems and the relationships between patronage systems, 
successful health-care provision and health outcomes.’  
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Moral Populism 
 
The exclusionary side of moral populism in its various guises has been extensively 
studied in Congo, particularly in connection with the denial of citizenship rights for 
‘Banyarwanda’ populations, the rise of rural Mai-Mai militias in eastern Congo and 
conflicts over land, citizenship and authority. When conflict broke out in the early 
1990s in eastern Congo, tensions between different power networks with links to local 
ethnic communities were already simmering over issues related to land, citizenship 
and positions of authority (Pottier, 2010; Mamdani, 2002). Land grabbing by local and 
national elites, which started under Mobutu, intensified and had the effect of eroding 
customary orders and marginalising peasant populations. While many customary 
chiefs had agreed to sell off ancestral lands to a new class of landowners and were 
well integrated into local and ethnically based power networks, in selling lands they 
lost their capacity to distribute it to their ‘ethnic’ subjects. Chiefs, politicians and other 
political actors, however, framed the collapse of the customary order as a 
consequence of the encroachment of foreigners on the ‘ancestral lands’. This was a 
breeding ground for the creation of local defence groups and rural militias, explaining 
why during the Congo wars, land competition was further militarised, and discourses 
of autochthony took centre stage in armed groups’ strategies (Vlassenroot, 2000).  
 
For Mobutu, ethnicity proved to be a strong instrument to divide the growing 
opposition, which particularly in the Kivu provinces started to develop in the early 
1990s. During the democratisation process, Mobutu introduced the notion of 
‘géopolitique’ according to which national institutions and public positions had to be 
composed based on ethnic quotas and local positions could only be occupied by those 
originating from the region. It helped to divide attention of the opposition and to spark 
ethnic tension in the then Shaba province, Kisangani and the Kivus. Political tribalism 
also fragilised the power of Kivu’s civil society platforms, with rivalries growing 
between leaderships from different ethnic communities and confirming ethnicity as 
the main fault-line. Urban-based ethnic mutuelles, which originally aimed at 
promoting ethnic solidarity and culture, became powerful instruments for local 
strongmen both to mobilise co-ethnics and to control parallel modes of cooperation 
at the grassroots level. 
 
Nationalism is another form of moral populism which is rife in Congo. Sometimes it 
takes the form of exclusionary ethno-nationalism. This is the case in the various 
conflicts opposing so-called ‘allochthones’ such as the Banyarwanda in North Kivu and 
the Banyamulenge and Barundi in South Kivu and the so-called ‘autochthones’ in both 
provinces. In these conflicts the latter tend to claim that all Kinyarwanda and Kirundi 
speakers are ‘allochthones’ and as such have no rights to land and citizenship in Congo 
(Jackson, 2006). Some authors have measured the strength of nationalist identity 
through ethnic moral populism (Weiss and Carayannis, 2005). Others have directly 
correlated ethnic moral populism with violence (Human Rights Watch, 1996, 2003; 
Willame, 1997; Africa Watch Committee, 1993). Ethnic moral populism has also been 
associated with sexual violence, as it is often framed as a ‘weapon of war’ used against 
individuals and ethnic communities (Duroch et al., 2011; Longombe et al., 2008;  
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Human Rights Watch, 2009). Yet, research has shown that sexual violence is rarely 
ethnically motivated (Baaz and Stern, 2010).  
 
Other forms of moral populism also exist in Congo, including religious (Eggers, 2015; 
Nelson, 1992), traditional, democratic and anti-imperialism/neo-colonialism forms. 
For instance, in addition to ethnicity and stateness, Mai-Mai groups combine all these 
themes to justify their claims to public authority and to solicit support from civilians 
(Hoffmann, 2015). This kind of multi-facetted moral populism is on display with Mai-
Mai groups being instituted in reaction to the arrival of international mining 
companies or being involved with power struggles around mining. One example is the 
case of Mai-Mai Yakutumba, an armed group operating for several years already in 
Fizi (South Kivu) and in 2014 also targeting a mining company. The group claimed that 
a local chief had sold off a mining area to CASA Minerals, a Virgin Islands incorporated 
company engaged in gold exploration. The group attacked the site and framed it as a 
protest against the alleged sale to CASA of ‘their’ hill, the gold-rich Akyanga Mountain, 
seen as part of the Babembe’s ancestral grounds (Verweijen, 2017). 
 
Today, democratic populism is being stoked by the regime’s increasing authoritarian 
tendencies. It is employed both by violent groups such as the various Mai-Mai factions 
and non-violent protest movements such as Lutte pour le changement (LUCHA, 
Struggle for Change), which has become an alternative channel for efforts to 
pressurise the government to hold elections. Further delays of the elections to allow 
the regime to stay in power longer than mandated gave a new impetus to the 
mobilising potential of armed groups. For instance, in June-July 2017 a new coalition 
of armed groups, the Coalition nationale du people pour la souverainete du Congo 
(CNPSC, The national coalition of the people for Congolese sovereignty) issued a 
declaration in which it stated that its objective was to ‘chase Kabila from power since 
he will not let go of it as long as the Rwandans do not yet have their province’.4  
 
  
                                                     
4 CNSPC, declaration, July 2017 
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Networks, Complexity, and International Interventions 
 
If we can draw one overarching policy implication from the Congo wars, it is the 
growing disconnect between the existing international conflict response toolkit and 
the complexity of violence on the ground—a disconnect that is neither limited to the 
Great Lakes nor to Africa, as trends in the changing nature of organised violence 
globally attest. The struggle for power over people, territory, and resources in large 
parts of the globe is networked and violent. And the outcomes of these struggles are 
increasingly unpredictable. The overwhelming yet under-addressed need to manage 
conflict complexity, including transnational dynamics and the proliferation of non-
state actors in conflict, is at the core of current policy and academic debates about the 
types and range of interventions by international and regional organisations. The 
limits of binary, state-centred approaches to complex, transnational, and networked 
conflicts like the Congo wars were recognised in three UN blockbuster reports that 
reviewed the UN peace and security architecture in 2015.5 Since then, policy makers 
are increasingly developing regional strategies as a way to address this issue. 
 
Academic and policy literature points to a number of reasons for the persistent 
violence in DRC despite enormous international investments in peace efforts. These 
reasons range from the slow pace of SSR and reintegration processes; the lack of 
attention to local unresolved land access disputes; the unresolved issue of citizenship; 
inter- and intra- community disputes over political, military and economic influence; 
competition over the control of mineral exploitation and trading connections; the 
nature of the state; the lack of progress in political reform and decentralisation; and 
regional power politics (Carayannis and Vlassenroot, 2017). Some have argued that 
the failure to end the violence in DRC is because peacebuilding interventions have 
targeted national dynamics and processes and overlooked local actors and local peace 
processes (de Coning, 2013; Autesserre, 2010). However, there is a growing realisation 
that if interventions in Congo have failed to end the violence it is not because of their 
failure to engage with local contexts sufficiently, but rather due to the inability of 
interventions to respond to and engage at various scales of violence (Stearns et al., 
2013, 2017; Carayannis, 2017). 
 
 
                                                     
5 High Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO) 
http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf; the Advisory Group of Experts 
on Peacebuilding (AGE) 
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/150630%20Report%20of%20the%20AGE%20on%
20the%202015%20Peacebuilding%20Review%20FINAL.pdf; Global Study on UNSC 
Resolution 1325 http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/UNW-GLOBAL-STUDY-
1325-2015%20(1).pdf; African Politics, African Peace Report 
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/African-Peace-Missions/ 
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The Political Economy of Public Authority: An Integrated Framework 
 
Conflict and violence have complex socio-cultural, economic, and political factors. The 
framework of the political economy of public authority and its three constituent logics 
is designed to capture this complexity. As we have argued, these logics are manifested 
and operated through power networks that cut across conventional boundaries such 
as public/private and local/national/regional/international. 
 
The incorporation of the notion of network into our analytical framework enables a 
better appreciation of how violence and conflict is produced across scales. It also gives 
us a more accurate understanding of Congolese politics and political order, which is 
an arena of interaction of a multitude of public authorities and is characterised by 
intensified competition between personality-based networks of access (Jackson, 
2006). Thus, power is not primarily produced by and located in institutions, but in 
network connections of individuals. These networks largely define political, security, 
social and economic conditions and realities. 
 
Spatial mapping exercises could be useful both for analysis and for more targeted 
engagement. However, while the general political and economic rationales of the 
networks researched thus far are well known, we do not know enough about their 
reach and the specifics of their transactional politics. How much money is being 
distributed through these patronage networks? What is the price of political loyalties 
and political services in the political marketplace? How do first-tier networks engage 
with second-tier networks? What are the distribution keys in the various rapportage 
systems, and how much is allocated to each layer? Also, while it is clear that elites 
profit from their political positions to enrich themselves, the extent to which their 
private fortunes have been used to procure political loyalty and support is unclear. 
Researching this is a challenge, which is why there is so little written to date. It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to get access to the inner circle of these networks. Where 
this has been done, investigative journalists have relied on publicly available 
documents followed up by interviews (Kavanagh and McCarey, 2017; Kavanagh, 
Wilson and Wild, 2016).  
 
Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Interventions 
 
The UN Security Council’s nearly two decades of engagement in Congo and the Great 
Lakes Region of Africa shows some distinct post-Cold War trends in Council 
peacekeeping mandates: a trend towards greater cooperation and interaction with 
regional actors; the authorisation of increasingly robust mandates with increasing 
focus on protection of civilians; and innovation in UN responses mostly through ad-
hocery and in reaction to events on the ground (Carayannis, 2016). Much has been 
written about the challenges and shortcomings of UN peace operations in DRC (Smis, 
et al., 2002; Turner, 2007; Gambino, 2008; Tull, 2009; Koko, 2011; Wanki, 2011; ICG, 
2012; Autessere, 2015; Froitzheim, 2014; Koops, 2015; Carayannis, 2014; Pangburn 
and Carayannis, 2015). Taken collectively, the literature we surveyed points to a 
number of key issues that hamper international efforts to keep the peace: internally  
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contradictory mandates and mandate implementation issues; flawed analysis of local 
conditions and local actors; an inability for interventions to adapt to a constantly 
changing conflict environment; a failure to protect civilians; and flawed assumptions 
about peace processes, including stabilisation and the use of force. Some consider 
MONUSCO to be the ‘emblem of the flaws of the UN’s broader peacekeeping project’ 
(Gowen, 2016). One of the little written about success stories of UN peace operations 
in Congo is Radio Okapi, established by MONUC/MONUSCO, and which has operated 
as a national radio station (Udo-Udo Jacob, 2014, 2016).  
 
The growing trend in peace enforcement, together with more civilian protection 
mandates, continues despite having little consensus of what we mean by civilian 
protection in the context of peacekeeping. A study by the Stimson Center in 2009 
revealed gaps in capacity, knowledge, and training in the protection of civilians (Holt 
et al., 2009). These trends have exposed the operational tensions in MONUSCO’s 
multiple and sometimes competing mandates. In contrast to Council intent, robust 
military action undermined civilian protection and led to growing pressure to either 
condition support to the FARDC in joint operations or to cease operations altogether 
(Boutellis, 2013; Carayannis, 2015). Ironically, MONUSCO is also where many of the 
UN’s most innovative approaches in protection of civilian tools, such as joint 
protection teams, community liaison assistants and community alert networks, were 
first deployed (Karlsrud, 2015).  
 
One key lesson on the use of force from twenty years of peacekeeping in DRC is that 
‘backyard operations’ (peace enforcement by the region) in this region have not led 
to peace; in the case of Congo, and Zimbabwe’s invoking of Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) principles to intervene militarily on behalf of Laurent 
Kabila during the Second Congo War, they have often prolonged and exacerbated the 
war (MacLean, 2002; Carayannis and Weiss, 2005; Carayannis, 2015). When an entire 
region is deeply divided by war, it cannot effectively enforce the peace, even if it has 
been successful in reaching a negotiated settlement.  In other words, combatants 
cannot enforce the peace against themselves. They can participate in peacemaking, 
and ultimately must do so, but if there is to be peace enforcement, others will have to 
do it. Moreover, in such regionally integrated conflicts of the magnitude and 
complexity of the Congo wars, building the peacekeeping capacity of regional 
organisations alone is unlikely to lead to successful peace enforcement. So, while the 
closeness of regional and sub-regional groupings to local conflict areas gives them the 
vested interests to seek stability in their region, this close proximity and the Congo 
wars’ regional embeddedness has been a double-edged sword, as neighbours are part 
of the patronage networks in the regional political market. 
 
The same dynamics that have challenged peace enforcement in DRC by the region 
have also weakened MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) —regional 
cleavages and competition (Rugeje and Maeresera  2016) and embeddedness in a 
regional political market. Although the initial deployment of the FIB was applauded by 
some as a useful instrument, despite questions of its legal basis (Sheeran and Case, 
2014), its military utility has been limited. The composition of its force from SADC  
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countries with regional rivalries has resulted in a reluctance to act during certain 
operations, and it rarely provided the leverage required to encourage the 
implementation of political commitments by the key protagonists. The overarching 
conclusion is that the FIB is one instrument of a broader political strategy but was 
completely disconnected from that strategy (Stearns, 2015; Berdal and Ucko, 2015); 
and that the trend towards robust peace enforcement in Congo has had an adverse 
effect on the mandate to protect civilians (Karlsrud, 2015).   
 
Despite deep regional divisions, regional actors can (and did) initiate and successfully 
negotiate agreements to end conflicts in which large and important portions of that 
region are themselves participants in the conflict. However, the literature suggests 
that the more regionally-based the conflict is in terms of state actors involved in it, 
the more difficult the task of mediation becomes without external partners—partly 
due to capacity constraints but mostly to the need for external guarantors and 
credible, punitive threats for non-cooperation. In DRC, the problem has not been 
negotiating agreements but in ensuring their implementation once they have been 
signed. Although the most recent Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) 
was set up to reverse this history, initiate a comprehensive political process and hold 
stakeholders accountable, it too has been undone by purposeful delays on the 
national level, the absence of real political will amongst its regional signatories, and 
an international effort that has taken an overly technical approach to the PSCF’s key 
commitments (De vries, 2015, 2016; Post, 2015; Pangburn and Carayannis, 2015). 
Powerful states in the region, which are deeply mistrusting of one another, have often 
worked behind-the-scenes to undermine multilateral efforts, to ensure they are the 
ones to determine the direction of international policy (International Crisis Group, 
2014; Mbugua, 2014).  
 
A key task for UN peacekeepers and development actors in DRC has been the 
extension or restoration of state authority, yet nearly twenty years of effort have 
neither stabilised eastern DRC nor restored state authority throughout the country. 
This is largely due to an overly technical approach so deeply ingrained that it does not 
allow for innovation; combined with a lack of political will at the centre for real 
transformation (de Vries, 2015). The state is not being built in a vacuum, but rather in 
a context of multiple existing and competing authorities (of which the current state 
authorities are one) that operate around particular logics—in DRC this is often the 
logic of the political marketplace. Hence, the recent conclusion in policy circles for the 
need for a greater emphasis on the primacy of politics in peace interventions (HIPPO, 
2015). Another key challenge has been the inability to effectively integrate 
subnational, non-state structures and informal institutions into post-conflict 
governance mechanisms (Ogbaharya, 2008). Yet the links between the local and 
national politics also have implications for extending state authority, as local actors 
competing for local authority are embedded in networks that include national elites, 
sometimes even ones in the region. MONUC/MONUSCO and its partners have largely 
ignored the prevailing logic of the marketplace, and failed to recognise that one 
cannot simply build the state locally in isolation of national dynamics, and without 
understanding how local actors relate to national and even regional dynamics.  
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Interventions in Stabilisation, SSR and DDR 
 
The origin of this stabilisation agenda stems from the Bosnian war and was further 
developed during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts to become a key concept in 
international discourse and policy response for a variety of conflict contexts. Also, a 
multitude of definitions and approaches to stability as ambition and stabilisation as 
strategy exist, often leading to conflicting understandings and interventions. While in 
its broadest sense, stability reflects a social, political and economic transformation, in 
many cases stabilisation strategies tend to prioritise security objectives and the 
protection of a specific political order that can guarantee this stability. State fragility 
is considered the main constraint to stability, so state structures need to be reinforced 
through stabilisation efforts. One downside of this approach is that it ignores that 
state fragility, as the case of DRC shows, has become a normal condition of life and 
local responses have developed, leading to new patterns of regulation and 
governance. 
 
In DRC, the first port of call in reforming the security sector has been the disarmament, 
demobilisation, and reintegration or repatriation (DDR) of armed groups. As the 
largest intervention in nearly all of the UN’s ongoing large-scale peacekeeping 
missions, DDR takes up the tasks of restoring public security, law and order (Berdal 
and Ucko, 2013). DDR interventions have been part of ‘complex’ and 
‘multidimensional’ UN peacekeeping operations since 2007. In DRC, three national 
DDR plans over the 20 years of conflict have yet to yield any significant reforms of the 
security sector or a dismantling of armed groups (Onanna and Taylor, 2010; Kets and 
de Vries, 2014; Baaz and Verweijen, 2013; White, 2010). With the rise of violent 
extremism elsewhere, policy debates today focus on whether the UN needs a next 
generation DDR program to manage conflicts with violent extremist actors 
(Chowdhury Fink, 2015) or whether existing DDR tools and practices should be 
integrated with the tools of countering violent extremism (CVE) (Cockayne and O’Neil, 
2015: 144) and avoid a one size fits all approach. 
 
Security governance in DRC, however, is dominated by patron-client networks 
engaged in struggles over resources and power, which continue to produce violence 
and instability (Hoffman & Vlassenroot, 2016). Armed groups strongly rely on civilian 
support networks, which include national and local politicians, customary authorities 
and community leaders. These elites are often responsible for the continued presence 
of armed groups and their involvement in power struggles. These links provide armed 
groups with additional legitimacy, while the same groups help to protect civilian 
leaders’ local interests and influence (Hoffmann & Vlassenroot, 2014). These networks 
cross the usual boundaries between public and private domains and can stretch from 
the highest political level to the lowest ranking security officials (Carayannis, 2017; 
Hoffmann, Vlassenroot and Büscher, 2016). These networks also blur the boundaries 
between civilian and military actors, as armed groups are embedded in social 
networks that include local authorities, provincial and national politicians, private 
sector, and civil society representatives, sometimes around resource extraction 
protection rackets (Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, 2013; Schouten, 2013). There is very  
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little trust between ordinary people and security services, which are seen as corrupt 
and even as complicit with criminals. This vast body of disenfranchised and 
impoverished people has developed countless self-help initiatives to provide for and 
protect themselves and their communities. These include vigilante groups carrying out 
so-called ‘justice populaire’ in cities such as Bunia and Uvira and armed groups in the 
hinterlands such as the Raiya Mutomboki in South Kivu and the Front for the Patriotic 
Resistance of Ituri Militia (FRPI) in South Irumu in Ituri, which claim to defend their 
communities from a rapacious government and neighbouring communities 
(Hoffmann, Vlassenroot and Büscher, 2016; Schouten, 2016; Verweijen, 2015). 
 
Thus, the structure, or the complexity of a particular conflict, presents difficulties for 
strategies to demobilise fighters and particularly to reintegrate them once a cease-fire 
has been reached. Not only must fighters be de-linked from military command and 
control structures that may, as in DRC, transcend territorial boundaries, but the forces 
themselves must be de-linked from the political economies of violence—a key 
structural obstacle to transitions from war to peace—and from other support 
networks in which they may be embedded (Carayannis, 2005).  Reintegration into non-
rent-seeking economies is thus critical for the prevention of re-recruitment into new 
rebel armies, as well as to prevent fighters from being drawn into criminal networks 
to supply the labour for the political economies that help sustain violent protest 
movements and greedy warlords alike.  Yet in DRC, the political-economic networks 
around which armed groups and the national army are organised have been largely 
ignored (Kets and de Vries, 2014). In some cases, armed groups have been integrated 
into the national armed forces with their command structures and networks intact, 
only to be remobilised for rebellion. There are also key gender dimensions in DDR, 
which are well documented; yet efforts have been largely technical exercises, based 
on a technical approach to security and institutional reform rather than on strategies 
to dismantle the current divided and patronage-based system of security governance. 
 
Justice Interventions 
 
Research on Congo shows that despite enormous investments in justice interventions, 
justice is still out of reach for most people in DRC. Formal judicial structures, like the 
courts, are not only expensive to access, they are also physically distant from large 
segments of the community, especially in rural areas. Peace Tribunals (Tribunal de Paix 
or Tripaix), are a new formal justice mechanism established to fill the void created by 
the abolishment of customary courts and, in principle, to make it easier for local 
communities to access justice. Yet, many of these courts have yet to be built in every 
territoire, forcing people to travel hundreds of kilometres to access the court in their 
area. A number of Tripaix lie vacant, as judges refuse to serve in remote areas. Where 
courts are accessible, the weakness of formal justice systems and endemic corruption 
mean that people get the justice they can afford. Part of the problem originates with 
the nature of the peace agreements, which privilege power sharing over fighting 
impunity (Davis, 2013). In turn, the absence of justice continues to challenge efforts 
to build a sustainable peace in Congo (Savage, 2006). 
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Because of the dysfunctions of the Congolese justice system, across the country, 
armed groups, traditional and religious leaders, NGOs and even state security actors 
offer their own forms of justice. It is part of the Congolese ethos of citoyenneté (some 
would even say debrouillardisme or ingenuity) of Congolese communities to overcome 
these deficiencies that has led individuals, civil society groups and other non-state 
actors to play an important role in adjudicating disputes. This dates back to the period 
of Mobutu. Armed groups are merely the latest addition to this. While this presents a 
broader marketplace for beneficiaries, these structures are often unregulated, making 
justice outcomes even more unpredictable. Citizens engage in ‘forum-shopping’ 
depending on the crime and to pursue retribution for grievances, but they do so in 
search of a fair process or at least one that will advantage them, not necessarily out 
of preference. This has also lead to the growth of justice populaire, where gangs or 
groups of likeminded citizens (sometimes organised along tribal or ethnic lines, or 
under the logic of moral populism) take matters into their own hands, and dole out 
harsh punishments with few components of due process such as a defence or an 
impartial jury (Verweijen, 2015). Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, justice 
populaire cannot only be ascribed to the malfunctioning state-led justice and security 
apparatus. Rather, it has emerged out of a wider crisis of authority, which results, in 
part, from the eroding role of customary chiefs, religious leaders and elders despite 
the fact that these actors maintain a considerable level of legitimacy. Other causes are 
the high level of social conflicts and the militarisation of society, which justifies 
violence as a solution to conflicts and other social problems, and the presence of 
alternative justice mechanisms.  Justice populaire also provides a way in which groups 
with limited access to official political channels, particularly youth, try to assert socio-
political agency.  
 
The fragmentation and competition among judicial authorities is a common problem 
across DRC. In the territory of Muanda in Kongo Central province, for example, this 
fragmentation is particularly evident, as residents not only have to navigate between 
jurisdictions of state and customary judicial structures, but also between those and a 
third system of justice, governed by various traditional religious groups (Bazonzi and 
Carayannis, 2017). These groups base their forms of justice on narratives of 
autochthony, free from and distrustful of external actors, and have gained a following 
in rural areas throughout the province. Their growth, built on the success of the now 
banned Bundu Dia Kongo (BDK) movement and the powerful Kimbanguist church, 
have created an additional justice forum (Bazonzi and Carayannis, 2017). The 
multiplicity of justice providers and the unpredictability of results leads to frequent 
disputes within communities over what decision should be enforced, and which 
judicial authority is legitimate.  
 
By most accounts, rape and sexual violence has become a systematic weapon in the 
Congo wars (Banwell, 2014; Bartels et al., 2013) yet has also become widespread 
among civilians. And while considered a violation of human rights and the penal code, 
community mediation, often a customary based process that resolves disputes 
through mediation generally involving an amicable arrangement, has increasingly 
been viewed as a credible forum for promoting access to justice on the local level, and  
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is often cited as an informal justice option for survivors of sexual and gender-based 
violence (SGBV). However, these mediation processes, rooted in customary law and 
often led by male community leaders or family members, rarely address gender 
inequality and power structures as the underlying causes of violence against women. 
Conversely, they often seek to prioritise the family structure and social cohesion over 
the voice and agency of the victims. Despite this and the knowledge that SGBV crimes 
fall under the penal code, women still opt for community mediation over the courts, 
mostly due to costs and community pressure.  
 
Of the various transitional justice interventions, the mobile courts system remains one 
of the most controversial (Khan, 2011). Advocates of these interventions point to the 
local embeddedness of the mobile courts and their and local ownership as a key 
strength compared to external and hybrid justice interventions in Bosnia and Rwanda. 
However, in the absence of a systematic overhaul of the justice system, including 
prisons, and in a context of continued and generalised insecurity, mobile courts, as 
with SGBV prosecutions in the court system, rarely lead to long-term justice for 
victims, despite their recorded positive effects (Mansfield, 2009). Instead, they risk 
leaving victims dangerously exposed to their perpetrators.      
 
The prosecution of Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of the Movement for the Liberation of 
the Congo (MLC) rebellion during the Second Congo War, for war crimes initially 
established command responsibility and rape as a war crime. His case, and subsequent 
release on appeal in June 2018, 10 years after his initial arrest for crimes allegedly 
committed in CAR and not in DRC, has generated a vigorous debate about 
international criminal justice and the politics of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
in Congo specifically and across Africa generally (Carayannis, 2016; Ndahinda, 2013). 
The decision of which cases to pursue and the ICC’s initial small team methodology 
have adversely impacted the credibility of the international court as delivering justice 
equitably and its ability to avoid reinforcing false national narratives. It also cannot be 
the only judicial tool pursued in the aftermath of widespread violence. 
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